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SECOND-TIER CERTIORARI: ADVERSE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT AS A 
PREDICATE FOR FINDING A “MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE” IN 
GOVERNMENT APPEALS 




Quasi-judicial decisions of local governments are appealable as a 
matter of right to the circuit courts.1  The types of government decisions 
subject to appeal to the circuit court usually include orders of code 
enforcement boards, personnel boards, and municipal legislative bodies 
acting in a quasi-judicial capacity.  The subject matter of the decisions 
include compliance with building requirements, employment actions, and 
land use and zoning determinations. 
The certiorari jurisdiction of the district courts of appeal may be 
sought to review the circuit court’s appellate decision. This review is 
customarily referred to as “second-tier certiorari.” Among other 
requirements for second-tier certiorari, the district court of appeal is only 
authorized to issue the writ to the circuit court upon a determination that the 
decision results in a “miscarriage of justice.”  The Florida Supreme Court 
has equated a miscarriage of justice in this context with error that is so 
serious that justice requires that it be corrected.2  Further, the “miscarriage 
of justice” standard for second-tier certiorari contains a degree of flexibility 
and discretion and is generally determined on a case-by-case basis.3 
There are instances where the district courts of appeal grant second-tier 
certiorari finding a miscarriage of justice—not necessarily because of the 
effect on the petitioner, but because of the precedential impact of the 
decision on other cases. Some courts have also factored the public interest 
into the analysis.  This article examines the application of the miscarriage of 
justice standard based upon the precedential effect of the circuit court’s 
appellate decision, and in particular where the public interest is at stake.  
First, the article briefly introduces second-tier certiorari.  Second, the article 
sets forth the miscarriage of justice standard as articulated by the Florida 
 
∗ John A. Greco.  Deputy City Attorney and Chief Appellate Counsel for the City of Miami.  He 
practices in the areas of appellate, constitutional, governmental, administrative, labor, and employment 
law. 
1  Art. V, §§ 5(b), 20(c)(3), Fla. Const. 
2  Combs v. State, 436 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1993); Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523 
(Fla. 1995). 
3  Combs, 436 So. 2d at 93; Heggs, 658 So. 2d at 523. 
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Supreme Court.  Finally, the article analyzes authority from the district 
courts of appeal applying the miscarriage of justice standard based on the 
adverse precedential effect of the circuit court appellate decision and the 
public interest. 
 
APPEALS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT DECISIONS 
FIRST-TIER REVIEW 
 
Local government decisions, quasi-judicial in nature, are appealable, 
as a matter of right, to the circuit court.4  In City of Deerfield Beach v. 
Vaillant, the Florida Supreme Court elucidated the framework for the 
circuit court’s review of local government decisions: 
Where a party is entitled as a matter of right to seek review 
in the circuit court from administrative action, the circuit 
court must determine whether procedural due process is 
accorded, whether the essential requirements of the law 
have been observed, and whether the administrative 
findings and judgment are supported by competent 
substantial evidence.5 
Thus, on this “first-tier” review, the circuit court reviews the local 
government decision to determine whether it is supported by competent 
substantial evidence, complies with the essential requirements of the law, 




The district courts of appeal are authorized under their certiorari 
jurisdiction to review decisions of the circuit courts acting in their appellate 
capacity.6  This “second-tier” review, however, does not afford the parties a 
second appeal.7  As stated by the Florida Supreme Court, review becomes 
 
4  Art. V, §§ 5(b), 20(c)(3), Fla. Const.; Broward Cty. v. G.B.V. Int’l, Ltd., 787 So. 2d 838, 843 
(Fla. 2001) (“In brief, first-tier certiorari review is not discretionary but rather is a matter of right and is 
akin in many respects to a plenary appeal, whereas second-tier certiorari review is more restricted and is 
similar in scope to true common law certiorari.”). 
5  City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So. 2d 624, 626 (Fla. 1982). 
6  See Art. V, § 4(b)(3), Fla. Const. (providing certiorari jurisdiction of the district courts of 
appeal); see also Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(2)(B) (certiorari jurisdiction of district courts of appeal 
includes review of final orders of circuit courts acting in their review capacity). 
7  Custer Medical Ctr. v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 62 So. 3d 1086, 1093 (Fla. 2010) (“In other 
words, this Court has definitively expressed that certiorari cannot be used to grant a second appeal to 
correct the existence of mere legal error. . . . This is necessary because, unlike an appeal, common-law 
certiorari is an entirely discretionary exercise of jurisdiction by the court and is not taken as a matter of 
right.”). 
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narrower as it proceeds up the judicial ladder.8 
The Florida Supreme Court has described second-tier review as 
follows: 
We hold that where full review of administrative action is 
given in the circuit court as a matter of right, one appealing 
the circuit court’s judgment is not entitled to a second full 
review in the district court.  Where a party is entitled as a 
matter of right to seek review in the circuit court from 
administrative action, the circuit court must determine 
whether procedural due process is accorded, whether the 
essential requirements of the law have been observed, and 
whether the administrative findings and judgment are 
supported by competent substantial evidence.  The district 
court, upon review of the circuit court’s judgment, then 
determines whether the circuit court afforded procedural 
due process and applied the correct law.9 
Hence, in order to issue a writ of certiorari quashing a decision of the 
circuit court acting in its appellate capacity, the district court of appeal must 
determine that the circuit court applied the incorrect law or denied due 
process.  Further, as discussed in detail below, the writ of certiorari may not 
be issued unless the decision will result in a “miscarriage of justice.” 
 
THE “MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE” REQUIREMENT OF    
SECOND-TIER CERTIORARI REVIEW 
 
In addition to demonstrating failure to apply the correct law, for a 
court of appeal to issue the writ of certiorari in a second-tier proceeding, the 
failure to apply the correct law must also result in a “miscarriage of justice.”  
In Combs v. State,10 the Florida Supreme Court explained: 
In granting writs of common-law certiorari, the district 
courts of appeal should not be as concerned with the mere 
existence of legal error as much as with the seriousness of 
the error.  Since it is impossible to list all possible legal 
errors serious enough to constitute a departure from the 
essential requirements of law, the district courts must be 
allowed a large degree of discretion so that they may judge 
each case individually. The district courts should exercise 
 
8  Vaillant, 419 So. 2d at 626 (“As a case moves up the appellate ladder, each level of review 
does not become broader.”). 
9  Id. 
10 Combs v. State, 436 So. 2d 93, 93 (Fla. 1993). 
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this discretion only when there has been a violation of a 
clearly established principle of law resulting in a 
miscarriage of justice. 
 
It is this discretion which is the essential distinction 
between review by appeal and review by common-law 
certiorari.  A district court may refuse to grant a petition for 
common-law certiorari even though there may have been a 
departure from the essential requirements of the law.  The 
district court should use this discretion cautiously so as to 
avert the possibility of common-law certiorari being used 
as a vehicle to obtain a second appeal.11 
Later, the Florida Supreme Court elaborated that the standard of 
second-tier certiorari 
while narrow, also contains a degree of flexibility and 
discretion.  For example, a reviewing court is drawing new 
lines and setting judicial policy as it individually 
determines those errors sufficiently egregious or 
fundamental to merit the extra review and safeguard 
provided by certiorari.  This may not always be easy since 
the errors in question must be viewed in the context of the 
individual case.  It may also be true that review of 
administrative decisions may be more difficult, since care 
must be exercised to determine the nature of the 
administrative proceeding under review, and to distinguish 
between quasi-judicial proceedings and those legislative in 
nature.  There is no complete catalog that the court can turn 
to in resolving a particular case.12 
 
ADVERSE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT AS A BASIS FOR FINDING  
A “MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE” 
 
Based on the above framework for second-tier certiorari, the 
constraints on review prevent issuance of the writ to correct simple legal 
error.13  As stated by the Florida Supreme Court, the purpose of the writ on 
second-tier certiorari is not to afford a party a “second appeal.”14 
 
11  Id. at 95–96. 
12  Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 530–31 (Fla. 1995) (footnote omitted). 
13  See Ivey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 2000); Combs, 436 So. 2d at 93. 
14  Custer Medical Ctr. v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 62 So. 3d 1086, 1093 (Fla. 2010) (“In other 
words, this Court has definitively expressed that certiorari cannot be used to grant a second appeal to 
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LIMITED REVIEW OF CIRCUIT COURT APPEALS 
 
Aside from this extraordinary writ, there is no mechanism for a direct 
judicial review by the district courts of appeal over decisions of the circuit 
court acting in its appellate capacity. 
The Second District Court of Appeal discussed the lack of a 
mechanism to establish principles of law on cases that are appealed to the 
circuit court in Stilson v. Allstate Insurance Co.15  There, the Second 
District Court of Appeal considered a petition for writ of certiorari to 
review an affirmance of a summary judgment by the county court in a 
personal injury protection coverage claim.  In denying the petition, the 
Second District Court of Appeal determined that the circuit court and the 
county court may have misapplied the law, but the failure to extend existing 
precedent to the facts in that case did not violate a clearly established 
principle of law.  The Second District Court of Appeal further stated: 
This case highlights a significant problem within our 
existing judicial structure. It is difficult for the law to 
evolve in unreported decisions issued in circuit court 
appeals.  What evolution occurs may take conflicting 
approaches within the numerous circuits.  As a result, there 
may never be “clearly established principles of law” 
governing a wide array of county court issues, including 
PIP issues. 
 
There is a great temptation in a case like this one to 
announce a “miscarriage of justice” simply to provide 
precedent where precedent is needed.  We do not interpret 
Heggs as giving this court that degree of discretion in a 
certiorari proceeding.  Such an interpretation would invite 
certiorari review of a large number of the appellate 






correct the existence of mere legal error. . . . This is necessary because, unlike an appeal, common-law 
certiorari is an entirely discretionary exercise of jurisdiction by the court and is not taken as a matter of 
right.”). 
15  Stilson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 692 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). 
16  Id. at 982–83. 
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ADVERSE PRECEDENTIAL IMPACT AND THE PUBLIC   
INTEREST 
 
In Stilson, the Second District Court of Appeal resisted the 
“temptation”17 to find a miscarriage of justice to fill a vacuum of 
precedent.18  Later that year, however, in Department of Highway Safety & 
Motor Vehicles v. Alliston,19 the Second District Court of Appeal 
confronted a situation where the circuit court acting in its appellate capacity 
departed from the essential requirements of the law by requiring a more 
stringent standard of proof for license suspension based on DUI than 
mandated by statute.  The Second District Court of Appeal, after finding a 
departure from the essential requirements of the law, discussed the 
difficulty in application of the “miscarriage of justice” standard: 
Although we conclude that the circuit court applied the 
incorrect law in its review of this administrative order, this 
does not necessarily allow us to grant certiorari in this 
second-tier proceeding. The more difficult question in this 
case is whether the circuit court’s error rises to the level 
that can be corrected as a “miscarriage of justice.” Despite 
all of the efforts of the supreme court and the district 
courts, the test to determine when a “miscarriage of justice” 
has occurred remains easier to state than to apply. In 
measuring the seriousness of an error to determine whether 
second-tier certiorari is available, one consideration is 
whether the error is isolated in its effect or whether it is 
pervasive or widespread in its application to numerous 
other proceedings. See, e.g., Progressive Specialty Ins. Co. 
v. Biomechanical Trauma Ass’n, 785 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 2001); Stilson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 692 So. 2d 979 
(Fla. 2d DCA 1997).  Thus, a circuit court order that is 
particularly fact-specific and fact-dependent, or an order 
that provides a result without a written opinion and 
therefore cannot act as precedent in future cases, will 
generally not merit certiorari review in the district court, 
even if the district court might disagree with the result. See, 
 
17  Id. (“There is a great temptation in a case like this one to announce a ‘miscarriage of justice’ 
simply to provide precedent where precedent is needed.”). 
18  See also Clark v. State, 170 So. 3d 69, 71–72 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (denying petition for 
second-tier certiorari; noting that there was a “great temptation” to “provide precedent where precedent 
is needed” but the solution was not through a second-tier certiorari proceeding). 
19  Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Alliston, 813 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). 
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e.g., Stilson, 692 So. 2d at 982 n.3.20 
After reviewing the standard, the Second District Court of Appeal 
concluded that “the circuit court’s error results in a miscarriage of justice 
requiring certiorari relief because it has precedential value and the circuit 
court is applying the same error to numerous other administrative 
proceedings involving the suspension of driver’s licenses.”  The Second 
District Court of Appeal explained: 
The circuit court’s order places a virtually impossible 
burden of proof on the DHSMV in attempting to suspend a 
person’s license for a DUI arrest.  As applied to future 
proceedings, the circuit court’s order would seemingly 
require the DHSMV to present affirmative evidence, in the 
form of testimony from inspectors and persons who 
administer breath tests, that each applicable inspection and 
breath test complied with every protocol set forth in the 
administrative rules. This is not what the law requires.21 
Other district courts of appeal decisions have adopted this basis for 
finding a miscarriage of justice, focusing however, not only on the adverse 
precedential effect of the decision, but also on considerations of the public 
interest, i.e. public safety and the burden on the government’s resources.  In 
State, Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Fernandez,22 the 
Third District Court of Appeal found a miscarriage of justice based on 
adverse precedential effect, but in reaching its decision, it also relied upon 
the significant public interest of the Department of Highway Safety and 
Motor Vehicles “in regulating a citizen’s driving privilege . . . and in 
keeping the public safe from persons that choose to operate vehicles while 
using intoxicants.”23  The Third District Court of Appeal further stated the 
circuit court’s decision would “impose a heavy burden on the Department’s 
limited resources.”24 
In Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Hirtzel,25 the 
First District Court of Appeal followed the Third District Court of Appeal’s 
opinion in Fernandez, finding a miscarriage of justice and granting a writ of 
second-tier certiorari.  After quoting the opinion in Fernandez, the First 
District Court of Appeal stated: “Here, too, in the interests of public safety, 
we are constrained to adhere to the precedent we have laid down in cases 
 
20  Id. at 145. 
21  Id. at 145–46 (footnote omitted). 
22  State, Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Fernandez, 114 So. 3d 266 (Fla. 3d DCA 
2013). 
23  Id. at 272. 
24  Id. 
25  Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Hirtzel, 163 So. 3d 527 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). 
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like this one.”26 
In State, Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. 
Wiggins,27 the First District Court of Appeal granted the petition for writ of 
certiorari in a second-tier proceeding involving a license suspension.  In 
finding a miscarriage of justice, the First District Court of Appeal stated: 
And although this case involves only Mr. Wiggins’s 
suspension, the Department says that many similar cases 
currently exist; and if the circuit court’s method of review 
is permitted, that the proverbial floodgates will open by 
giving the green light to circuit courts to independently 
review and second-guess the evidentiary weight to be 
placed on video evidence.  Under these circumstances, 
where no relief is otherwise available to the Department to 
curtail this practice, the context of this case warrants 
relief.28 
Many other district court of appeal decisions addressing adverse 
precedential effect and the public interest involve the Department of 
Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles.29  However, the district courts of 
appeal have considered these grounds for finding miscarriage of justice in 
other governmental30 and non-governmental contexts.31 
 
26  Id. at 531. 
27  State, Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Wiggins, 151 So. 3d 457 (Fla. 1st DCA 
2014), review granted, 168 So. 3d 231 (Fla. 2014). 
28  Id. at 470. 
29  See, e.g., Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Hofer, 5 So. 3d 766, 772 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2009) (noting that “Appellate courts, however, have found a miscarriage of justice and exercised their 
certiorari jurisdiction when a decision applies incorrect law and establishes principles of general 
application binding in subsequent cases.”); Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Icaza, 37 So. 
3d 309 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (granting second-tier petition for writ of certiorari; citing to Hofer and 
Lorenzo for proposition that writ may be issued based upon precedential value and effect on other 
proceedings); Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Falcone, 983 So. 2d 755, 759 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2008) (“As this court did in Alliston, 813 So. 2d at 145, we conclude that the circuit court’s error 
resulted in a miscarriage of justice requiring certiorari relief because it has precedential value and the 
circuit court is applying the same error to numerous other administrative proceedings involving the 
suspension of driver’s licenses.”); State Dep’t of Highway Safety v. Edgell-Gallowhur, 114 So. 3d 1081, 
1088 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (“The circuit court’s error established an incorrect legal principle that is 
binding precedent on all county court judges within the Eleventh Judicial Circuit . . . and is capable of 
repetition in future formal hearings, thereby continuing to deprive the Department of its ability to sustain 
a driver’s license suspension based upon evidence which is properly admitted under the existing statutes 
and administrative regulations.”). 
30  See Maple Manor, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 813 So. 2d 204, 207 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) 
(“Because the circuit court’s error has the potential to be applied to future administrative nuisance 
abatement proceedings, we further conclude that the circuit court’s error resulted in a miscarriage of 
justice.”). 
31  See State Farm Fla. Ins. Co. v. Lorenzo, 969 So. 2d 393, 398 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (granting 
second-tier certiorari and indicating that “the error could have a pervasive, widespread effect in other 
proceedings.”); GEICO Indem. Co. v. Gables Ins. Recovery, Inc., 159 So. 3d 151, 155–56 (Fla. 3d DCA 
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ADVERSE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT AS AN “INDEPENDENT”   
BASIS FOR FINDING A “MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE” 
 
Two cases from the Second District Court of Appeal demonstrate that 
court’s consideration of adverse precedential effect separate and apart from 
whether or not the actual parties to the action have suffered the miscarriage 
of justice in that particular case.  The cases are Progressive Specialty 
Insurance Co. v. Biomechanical Trauma Association, Inc.,32 and Gould v. 
State.33 
In Progressive Specialty Insurance Co., the county court erroneously 
granted summary judgment to Biomedical Trauma Association, Inc., 
(“Biomedical”) resulting in a final judgment for $131.09.  Progressive 
Specialty Insurance Company petitioned for second-tier certiorari, which 
was granted by the Second District Court of Appeal.  Thereafter, the circuit 
court in a different case recognized its error and receded from the case in a 
subsequent appeal.  Biomedical then moved for rehearing.  The Second 
District Court of Appeal granted rehearing finding that there was no longer 
a miscarriage of justice:  
As an isolated error, the circuit court’s affirmance in this 
case cannot be characterized as a miscarriage of justice. 
Given that the circuit court has already receded from its 
opinion in this case, it will have no adverse precedential 
affect upon future cases.  Although the legal analysis in our 
opinion, which has already been published . . . appears 
correct, we withdraw that opinion.34   
Thus, although the Progressive Specialty Insurance Company’s position 
was legally correct, the court withdrew the relief when the basis for the 
finding of miscarriage of justice no longer existed because the circuit court 
eliminated the adverse precedential effect in a subsequent decision. 
In Gould, the Second District Court of Appeal considered a second-tier 
petition for writ of certiorari to review a first-tier habeas corpus petition 
filed in circuit court.  The Second District Court of Appeal granted the 
petition, finding a miscarriage of justice, even though the petitioner was 
released from jail.  Regarding mootness due to the release from jail, the 
Second District Court of Appeal stated: 
 
2014) (“Because the Appellate Division’s ruling will potentially affect large numbers of claimants and 
large numbers of PIP claims processed by insurers, the error results in a miscarriage of justice.”). 
32  Progressive Specialty Ins. Co. v. Biomechanical Trauma Ass’n, Inc., 785 So. 2d 667, 668 (Fla. 
2d DCA 2001). 
33  Gould v. State, 974 So. 2d 441, 442, 446 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). 
34  Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 785 So. 2d at 668. 
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As a preliminary matter, the State asserts that Mr. Gould’s 
release from jail renders his petition for certiorari moot. 
“However, mootness does not destroy a court’s jurisdiction 
if the question raised is of great public importance or is 
likely to recur, or if the error is capable of repetition yet 
evading review.” Kelley v. Rice, 800 So. 2d 247, 250 (Fla. 
2d DCA 2001) (citations omitted). Mr. Gould claims that 
“first appearance judges in the Tenth Judicial Circuit 
routinely accept unsworn, conclusory uniform traffic 
citations from arresting officers to justify the arrest and 
continued detention of [DUI suspects].” The State does not 
dispute this assertion. Because this petition presents a 
question capable of repetition yet evading review, this court 
has jurisdiction to hear the merits even if the petition is 
moot. See Enter. Leasing Co. v. Jones, 789 So. 2d 964, 965 
(Fla. 2001) (holding that the court may retain jurisdiction 
despite mootness because the issue on appeal is likely to 
recur).35 
Regarding miscarriage of justice, the Second District Court of Appeal 
stated: 
Although we conclude that the circuit court applied 
incorrect law when reviewing Mr. Gould’s petition, this 
court cannot grant certiorari absent a showing that this 
departure from the essential requirements of the law 
constituted a “miscarriage of justice.” When determining 
whether the circuit court’s error amounts to a “miscarriage 
of justice,” an important factor is the effect of the error on 
other cases. Alliston, 813 So. 2d at 145. A circuit court’s 
decision that is particularly fact-dependent or fact-specific 
or that lacks precedential value because it was issued 
without a written opinion will generally not merit certiorari 
review. Id. However, a decision that establishes a principle 
of general application binding on lower courts results in a 
miscarriage of justice that warrants the exercise of this 
court’s certiorari jurisdiction. See id. at 145–46. 
 
The order denying Mr. Gould’s petition establishes the 
general principle that a uniform traffic citation, by itself, 
provides probable cause for a defendant’s arrest and 
continued detention. Furthermore, the circuit court 
 
35  Gould, 974 So. 2d at 444. 
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appellate decision in this case is binding on all three county 
courts within the Tenth Judicial Circuit.  See Fieselman v. 
State, 566 So. 2d 768, 770 (Fla. 1990). Because the circuit 
court’s application of incorrect law established a legal 
principle binding on lower courts that is neither fact-
dependent nor fact-specific, the circuit court’s decision 
results in a miscarriage of justice that warrants the exercise 
of this court’s certiorari jurisdiction.36 
Thus, even though the petitioner’s claim was moot, the Second District 
Court of Appeal found a miscarriage of justice where it determined that 
there would be an adverse precedential effect. 
 
THE FUTURE OF FINDING MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE BASED   
ON ADVERSE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT 
 
The Florida Supreme Court has not yet directly upheld adverse 
precedential effect as a basis for finding a miscarriage of justice.  However, 
in Futch v. Florida Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles,37 a 
dissent by Justice Canady referenced the doctrine: 
The circuit court’s error also resulted in a miscarriage of 
justice because it has precedential value in the Seventh 
Judicial Circuit, could affect many other administrative 
proceedings in that circuit, and substantially deprives 
DHSMV of its opportunity to sustain driver license 




The miscarriage of justice requirement of issuing a second-tier writ of 
certiorari remains a difficult standard to apply in practice in part due to the 
 
36  Id. at 446–47. However, the Second District Court of Appeal in Department of Highway 
Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Robinson, 93 So. 3d 1090, 1091–94 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012), found no departure 
from the essential requirements of the law in a case involving inconsistent decisions from different 
circuits. On denial of review, a concurring opinion by Justice Pariente stated: “In this case, the Second 
District apparently did not believe that the inconsistent results within its district, where one circuit court 
concluded that there was a due process violation in suspending a driver’s license when the arresting 
officer did not appear and where another circuit court made the opposite conclusion, reached the high 
threshold required to grant second-tier certiorari review. This may have been especially true in the 
particular case before it, where the circuit court actually found a due process violation and did not 
uphold the license suspension.” Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Robinson, 112 So. 3d 83, 
85 (Fla. 2013). 
37  Futch v. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 189 So. 3d 131 (Fla. 2016). 
38  Id. at 133–34. 
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fact that its application is considered on a case-by-case basis and therefore 
precedent does not provide useful guidance on the determination of what 
constitutes a miscarriage of justice.  At the same time, often, the district 
courts of appeal, in considering a petition for writ of certiorari to review a 
decision of the circuit court acting in its appellate capacity, are confronted 
with issues of significant public importance that may have an adverse 
precedential effect.  In this context, the district courts of appeal have 
adopted an approach that permits the finding of a miscarriage of justice 
based upon adverse precedential effect of the circuit court appellate 
decision without regard to whether the parties to the action suffered a 
miscarriage of justice in that case.  The district courts of appeal have also 
considered the public interest and the burden on the government agency in 
protecting that interest.  Hence, the writ has been used in the absence of the 
ability of district courts of appeal to address and correct errors that are in 
need of resolution by a further level of judicial review.  Where an appellate 
decision of the circuit court would have an adverse precedential effect and 
hamper the government agency’s ability to protect the public interest, local 
governments petitioning for a second-tier writ of certiorari would be well 
advised to consider this basis for demonstrating a “miscarriage of justice.” 
 
